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INTRODUCTION
It would be a sheer, ineffectual folly to argue that
compensation is exempt until it touches the hands [of the
debtor] or the bank checking account and from that instant
is completely available to a creditor possessing an
attachment order. If that be the case, where is the
exemption?'
Imagine two employees named Adam and John who work for
the same company. Both have the same occupation, work the
same amount of time, receive the same benefits, and deduct the
same amount of taxes from their paychecks. At the end of each
month, Adam and John receive their monthly paycheck, each
totaling $1,000. This monthly payment is the only source of
income for Adam and John, and both employees subsequently
deposit their paychecks into a personal checking account. Both
employees owe a debt of $1,000 to the same creditor.
Since both Adam and John are delinquent in their debt
obligations, the creditor seeks repayment. In November, in
conformity with the appropriate federal and state garnishing laws,
the creditor garnishes twenty-five percent of Adam's wages. As a
result, Adam receives a check for only $750, which he deposits
into his checking account.
At the same time, John receives his usual check of $1,000 and
deposits it into his checking account. The balance in his checking
account is $1,000, resulting solely from his November paycheck.
The next day, the creditor presents the bank with a writ of
garnishment for the funds in the bank account encompassing all
$1,000. John argues that under the wage garnishment laws, the
creditor should be entitled to only twenty-five percent or $250 of
the $1,000 in his bank account. If the creditor succeeds, John will
have no funds for an entire month upon which to live.
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
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Since the ruling in Dunlop v. First National Bank of Arizona,2
some federal and state courts have ruled that wages are not
exempted from garnishment once they leave the employer's
possession. As a result, in the situation presented above, John
would lose his entire $1,000. However, there are some state courts
that have reached the opposite result. After examining their state
statutes, some courts have concluded that the wage garnishment
exemption should extend to wages deposited into a bank account.
3
This article addresses the question whether wages should be
exempted from complete garnishment after they are deposited in a
financial institution based on the federal and the Louisiana statutes.
The article examines the issue in two parts. Since it is necessary to
contrast Louisiana's wage garnishment statute with the federal
statute, Section I first examines the question of wage garnishment
under the federal statute. Section I-A develops the background of
the federal statute and the reasons for its enactment. Section I-B
considers the case law commencing in Dunlop and continuing in
Melby v. Anderson.4 Since the courts appear to narrowly construe
Congress' intent behind the federal wage garnishment statutes,
Section I-C critically analyzes and questions the outcome reached
in the above cases. Finally, Section I-D offers suggestions to
rectify the jurisprudential shortcomings.
After examining the federal statute, Section II of the article
turns to the Louisiana statute exempting the garnishment of wages.
Since Louisiana state courts have yet to confront this issue, Section
1I-A examines how other state courts have interpreted their own
wage garnishment exemption statutes in light of the federal statute.
Section II-B then closely analyzes the Louisiana statute. In order
to fully answer the wage garnishment issue in Louisiana, Section
II-B examines the language, history, and legislative purpose behind
the state statute. Finally, Section II-C concludes by stating that
Louisiana courts should broadly interpret the state statute and
extend the garnishment exemption to wages deposited in bank
accounts.
2. 399 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975) (Consumer Credit Protection Act's
provisions restricting wage garnishment did not apply to funds deposited in
financial institutions).
3. See, e.g., Miller v. Monrean, 507 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1973); Daugherty v.
Central Trust Co., 504 N.E.2d 1100 (Ohio 1986); Midamerica Savings Bank v.
Miehe, 438 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1989); In re Kobernusz, 160 B.R. 844 (D. Colo.
1993).
4. 276 N.W.2d 274 (Wis. 1979) (garnishment restrictions under the CCPA
did not apply to wages after wages were paid to an employee and deposited into
his bank account).
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I. THE FEDERAL STATUTE: RESTRICTION ON THE GARNISHMENT OF
WAGES
A. Federal Statute Background
Wage garnishment has been defined as "the taking of the
debtor's wages directly from the employer to satisfy the debt owed
to the creditor."5 The protection of wages first developed in state
statutes to allow debtors to protect portions of their wages from
garnishment.6 These state statutes differed from one another, and
many statutes led to devastating results for a debtor and his family
as states allowed for the garnishment of a high percentage of
wages. 7  Congress eventually took note of the garnishment
problem and on May 29, 1968, passed the Consumer Credit
Protection Act (CCPA),8 which became effective on July 1, 1970. 9
The CCPA is an extensive Act currently encompassing 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693. The Act was originally composed of three
Subchapters but has since grown to six Subchapters, all with the
purpose of regulating consumer transactions. This article will
mainly focus on the sections within Subchapter II, Restrictions on
Garnishment, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677.
Though there exists much legislative history behind the passing
of the CCPA,' 0 it is quite evident that Congress was concerned
with the growing number of bankruptcies and believed these
increasing bankruptcies were the result of unrestricted state
garnishing laws. 1
Congress unified state garnishing requirements by allowing the
garnishment of twenty-five percent of disposable earnings or the
amount by which a debtor's weekly disposable earnings exceeded
thirty times the federal minimum wage rate, whichever amount is
5. Wayne M. Babovich, The Effect of the Garnishment Provisions of the
Consumer Protection Act Upon State Garnishment Laws, 9 Hous. L. Rev. 537,
537 (1972).
6. Ashley L. Rodgers, In re Pruss: Protecting Accounts Receivable From
Garnishment, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 435, 443-444 (2001). See David G. Epstein &
Steve H. Nickles, Debt: Bankruptcy, Article 9 and Related Laws 33 (1994);
Lawrence P. King & Michael L. Cook, Creditors' Rights, Debtors' Protection
and Bankruptcy 439-41 (2d ed. 1989).
7. See Robert D. Moran, Relief for the Wage Earner: Regulation of
Garnishment Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 12 B.C.
Indus. and Corn. L. Rev. 101, 101 (1970).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (2004).
9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1672-1673.
10. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1040 (1967); Rodgers, supra note 6, at 446.
11. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1040; Rodgers, supra note 6, at 446, 447.
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less.12  Thus, Congress allowed for an exemption of at least
seventy-five percent of a debtor's wages. The statute defines
"earnings" as "compensation paid or payable for personal services,
whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or
retirement program. '  The statute also defines "disposable
earnings" as the "part of the earnings of any individual remaining
after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by
law to be withheld."' 4 Finally, the CCPA allows states to set their
own standards for wage garnishment, as long as state laws do not
undermine the creditor restrictions set out in the federal statute.' 5
B. The Federal Jurisprudence
1. Dunlop v. First National Bank of Arizona
The issue concerning the CCPA was first discussed in Dunlop
v. First National Bank of Arizona.16 In Dunlop, the court was
called upon to determine whether the CCPA's provisions
restricting wage garnishments applied to funds that were deposited
in financial institutions. The First National Bank of Arizona was
served with writs of garnishment for certain funds deposited into
bank accounts by depositors named in the writs.' 7 The Department
of Labor responded by claiming that certain portions of the deposit
were protected from garnishment under the provisions of 15 U.S.C.18
§§ 1671-1677. The court first examined the language of these
statutes under Subchapter II of the CCPA, "Restrictions on
Garnishment," and found that there was no reference or mention of
financial institutions in these articles. 19 The district court next
compared Subchapter II to Subchapter I and Subchapter III.
Subchapter I consists of articles dealing with Consumer Credit
Cost Disclosure, and Subchapter III contains articles regulating
Credit Reporting Agencies. While financial institutions play a role
in Subchapters I and III, the court found that there "is not the
slightest hint in the wording of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 that the
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1673.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a). See Rodgers, supra note 6, at 446.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1677. See also Rodgers, supra note 6, at 446;
Hodgeson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1973); Hodgeson v.
Hamilton Mun. Ct., 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
16. 399 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975).
17. Id. at 855.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 856.
236 [Vol. 66
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[S]ubchapter [II] should be applied to financial institutions."20 The
court described Subchapter II as regulatory in nature, where the
"statute is concerned with the regulation of the 2amishment
process itself and not the protection of a given fund."2 The court
noted that if Congress intended to extend the restriction of wage
garnishment to funds deposited in a financial institution, Congress
would have specifically done so. 22 Finally, the court dismissed the
Department of Labor opinions in which the Department suggested
that Subchapter II should apply to funds deposited in bank
accounts. The court rejected the opinion on the basis that if the
court were to uphold the Department's suggestion, it would be
reading language and intent into the statutes that were not currently
present.23 The district court, therefore, held that Congress, through
the language and structure of the garnishment statute, did not
intend to protect wages from garnishment after they were
deposited into financial institutions.
2. Melby v. Anderson
The ruling in Dunlop was followed and subsequently expanded
in other courts and circuits. In Melby v. Anderson,24 the creditor,
Melby, attempted to collect on the debt owed by defendant
Marilyn Anderson by garnishing funds deposited in Marilyn and
LeRoy Anderson's joint checking account. 25  The Andersons
answered the complaint, claiming that the bank account consisted
solely of wages and of the $469.00 in the joint checking account,
seventy-five percent of the wages were protected from garnishment
under federal and state statutes. The court in Melby concluded that
"it was not the intent of the Congress to protect from garnishment
funds paid out as earnings after they went into the possession of an
employee . . . the intent was to protect the employment
relationship."26  The Melby court found the analysis in Dunlop
persuasive. However, the Melby decision took Dunlop a step
further: "It could not be clearer that the Congress was concerned
with the protection of earnings in the ordinary payroll process.
There is nothing to suggest that the restrictions on garnishment
were intended to apply to wages after they had been paid over to
20. Id.
21. Id. at 857.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 276 N.W.2d. 274. (Wis. 1979).
25. Id. at 275.
26. Id. at 276.
27. Id. at 277.
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the worker." 28 The Dunlop court denied the exemption when the
funds were deposited in financial institutions. The Melby court
denied exemption once the worker had obtained possession of the
wages, thus decreasing the scope of the wage exemption. In
addition, the court contended the deposited payroll checks were not
"disposable earnings" which the congressional Act intended to
protect.
The court in Melby also examined the defendant's argument
that there existed a difference between compensation "paid" and
compensation "payable" and, thus, even after the wages were paid,
the wages should still be afforded protection. The defendants cited
the cases of Philott v. Essex County Welfare Board29 and
Lawrence v. Shaw3 where the Supreme Court of the United States
construed the "paid" or "payable" language as to extending to a
fund after the monies have been received and deposited by the
recipient. The court held that the two cases were not applicable in
the wage garnishment context.
3 1
According to the Melby court, the courts that looked at the
issues in Philpott and Lawrence examined different statutes whose
language and history specifically protect those benefits from
creditors.32 The benefits protected in these two cases were "given
broader protection than that afforded earnings in the garnishment
proceedings under the federal Consumer Protection Act., 3 3 The
court in Melby did not examine the Wisconsin statute because the
defendants asserted their exemption based on federal law. As a
result, the court based its ruling on the interpretation of the federal
garnishment statutes under the CCPA.34
Finally, in addition to the ruling in Melby, other federal3 5 and
state 36 courts have followed the Dunlop approach and interpreted
28. Id. at 277-78.
29. 409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590 (1973) (extended protection from
garnishment to social security benefits after the funds were deposited in a bank
account).
30. 300 U.S. 245, 57 S. Ct. 443 (1937) (protected the garnishment of
veterans' compensation benefits before and after the beneficiary received them).
31. Melbyv. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Wis. 1978).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Usery v. First National Bank of Arizona, 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir.
1978) (though it does not cite Dunlop, the appellate court uses the same
statutory analysis and reaches the same conclusion: Wage garnishment
protection under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 does not apply to banks); In re
Lawrence, 205 B.R. 115 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (in deciding whether the
garnishment exemption could be extended to accounts receivable, the court
analyzed and accepted the decisions in Dunlop and Melby).
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the garnishment rules under the CCPA as not affording the debtor
protection after the wages have been deposited in a bank account.
C. Interpreting the Federal Statute in a Different Light
In interpreting the wage garnishment statutes of the CCPA,
courts have acknowledged the existence of the ambiguity37 and
have attempted to understand Congress' true intent regarding
whether wages should be exempt once placed in a financial
institution. In deciding the meaning of the garnishment statute,
courts should begin where all inquiries must begin-with the
language of the statute itself.38 The statutes in question,
Subchapter II, do not specifically discuss the protection of wages
when deposited in financial institutions.39 In addition, even some
specific language within the statutes is ambiguous. The Melby
court acknowledged the existence of ambiguity in the language set
forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1672 where the statute defines earnings as
compensation "paid or payable for personal services., 40 The court
noted that the face of the statute is ambiguous and thus gives
credence to the defendant's claim that Congress intended to restrict
garnishment of funds even after the earnings were "paid" to the
employee.41  Though the court later dismissed the defendant's
argument, the court clearly acknowledged ambiguity in the
language of the statute. If a statutory text is ambiguous, courts
should read it in light of its legislative history.42
36. See Edwards v. Henry, 293 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(following Dunlop and Melby, the state court held that Subchapter II of the
CCPA did not shelter from garnishment wages that were included in portions of
a worker's checking account); Frazer, Ryan, Goldberg, Keyt & Lawless v.
Smith, 907 P.2d 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (funds lose their partially exempt
status as earnings once they are deposited in a debtor's bank account).
37. See Melby v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Wis. 1979).
38. U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241,109 S. Ct. 1026,
1030 (1989).
39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (2004).
40. See Melby, 276 N.W.2d. at 276.
41. Id.
42. See Rodgers, supra note 6, at 440; Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393,
401, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1391 (1992). For discussions on statutory construction and
analysis see Rodgers, supra note 6, at 440-43 (discussing modem trends in
statutory construction); Phillip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1992);
Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the
Interpretation of Statutes, 25 Rutgers L.J. 621, 624 (1994) (emphasizing
legislative intent and history over textualism); Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct.
2005]
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It is in this ambiguous light that the courts neglected the
congressional intent as developed in the legislative history. The
Dunlop and Melby courts focused on Congress' intent to unify the
bankruptcy laws and protect the employer-employee relationship.43
The courts' findings and focus on the unifying congressional intent
were correct; however, the courts failed to give adequate attention
to the legislative history as a whole. They took a narrow,
interpretative approach and failed to examine the entire scope and
legislative spirit behind the garnishment statutes. Protecting the
employer-employee relationship might be one aspect of the
garnishment act, but it certainly is not the only aspect.4 There
exists legislative history on Congress' intent of the statutes as a
whole45 and the courts should have fully examined it.
It is clear and widely held that, when faced with a surge in the
number of personal bankruptcies, Congress intended to unify the
Rev. 231 (promoting the use of plain meaning); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain
Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 401, 433 (1994) (textualist look at how an ordinary
reader would understand the words); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1989) (examining purpose, intent,
and history as tools of interpretation); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 313-54
(1986) (discussing the role of integrity in statutory interpretation).
43. See Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 399 F. Supp. 855, 856 (D.
Ariz. 1975) ("The act was formulated by Congress as an attempt to cure a wide
range of abuses which had surfaced over the years in the growing field of
consumer credit .... The purpose of Subchapter II is to govern the relationship
between employers and employees."); Melby, 276 N.W. 2d at 277 ("[T]he
conclusion that Title III is to be applied only to wage garnishments affecting the
employer-employee relationship is almost expressly, and certainly implicitly,
required by the language of Title III.").
44. The idea of protecting the employer-employee relationship arises from
the nature of wage garnishment. It is important to clarify the difference between
the concept of garnishment and attachment. For this distinction see Law of
Elec. Funds Trans. Systems Chapter 18.02 (January 2004):
Attachment and garnishment are legal processes established by state
laws for the seizure of a debtor's property. The laws concerning these
processes vary considerably from state to state.
"Attachment" generally refers to the process by which an individual's
assets, including bank accounts, are seized for payment of a debt. If a
debtor's bank account can be identified, the entire account may be
commonly attached.
"Garnishment" generally refers to a legal process served on a debtor's
employer, directing him to withhold a percentage of the debtor's
earnings over a period of time to satisfy a debt. In some jurisdictions,
periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement plan also can be
garnished.
45. See Rodgers, supra note 6, at 446; see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 90-1040
(1967); H.R. Rep. No. 90-1397 (1968).
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bankruptcy laws between the states, lower the number of personal
bankruptcies, protect the borrowers, protect the debtors'
employment, lower the burden on interstate commerce, and
promote economic efficiency.46 By limiting the amount of wages
that could be garnished from a debtor, Congress desired to protect
not only the way by which the debtors receive income (via the
employer-employee relationship), but also the debtors' livelihoods
after they receive their wages. By allowing a debtor to retain at
least seventy-five percent of his income, Congress is not only
protecting the employer-employee relationship, but it is also
protecting the debtor individually by giving him means upon
which to live, not only as an employee, but also as a consumer.
The House Report to Congress even states that the bill restricting
the garnishment of wages "will relieve countless debtors driven by
economic desperation from plunging into bankruptcy in order to
preserve their employment and insure a continued means of
support for themselves and their families.A7
More specifically, the force behind wage exemptions in wage
statutes has long been justified by three main policies:
"Legislatures have sought to encourage debtor rehabilitation, to
provide minimum security for the debtor's family, and to relieve
the community of some burdens of social welfare." 48 Congress
hoped that wage protection would allow debtors to maintain their
basic needs.49 Before the statute was passed, wage garnishment
victimized the nation's workers and led to "job loss, personal
anguish, and humiliation., 50 As a result of wage garnishments, the
debtor "will be left not only without income to satisfy the
obligation[s] for which his wages were garnished, but also without
income to pay his rent or for food.",5 1 Moreover, in deciding the
46. See Rodgers, supra note 6, at 447.
47. Rodgers, supra note 6, at 447 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 90-1040) (emphasis
added).
48. Ronald T. Taylor, Debtor Exemptions in New Mexico, 6 Nat. Resources
J. 467, 467 (1966) (citing Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954)
(where the court said that the state has an interest in its exemption laws to "the
end that owners of exempt property and their families shall not be reduced to
absolute destitution, thus becoming a charge upon the public.")); George L.
Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1950); Hollywood
Credit Clothing Co. v. Jones, 117 A.2d 226 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955).
49. Rodgers, supra note 6, at 447 (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.
642, 94 S. Ct. 2431 (1974)).
50. Moran, supra note 7, at 105 (citing 114 Cong. Rec. 1613 (1968)
(remarks of Congressman Resnick)).
51. Note, Wage Garnishment under the Consumer Credit Protection Act:
An Examination of the Effects on Existing State Law, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
357, 359 (1970) [hereinafter Wage Garnishment].
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amount to exempt from garnishment, lawmakers had to consider
whether the debtor's reduced paycheck would be enough to meet
everyday living expenses and other obligations, or whether it
would force him into bankruptcy and possibly make him a ward of
the state.52
It is clear that Congress intended to protect the employer-
employee relationship but not in the interest of the employer.
Rather, Congress intended to protect the interest of the debtor. To
protect the well-being of the debtor, Congress wanted to make sure
that the employee did not lose his job if his wages were
garnished.53
However, protecting the employee's job security was not the
only intent of Congress. Congress also wanted to protect the
debtor's family.54 These are two distinct concepts behind the wage
garnishment statute that the courts have blurred together. The
courts have focused solely on the congressional intent to protect
the employee's job and have failed to acknowledge that Congress
intended to provide more than job security. If Congress intended
only to protect employees from losing their jobs as a result of
garnishing proceedings, there would be little reason for Congress
to protect as much as seventy-five percent of an employee's wages.
The legislative history,55 as well as the significant percentage of
the garnishment exemption, exemplify the dual intentions behind
the garnishment statutes: to protect the employee's job security
and personal well-being and to protect the employee's family.
As a result, if Congress sought to provide the debtor with
enough money and means to support himself and his family, why
would Congress not intend to protect the debtor's wages after they
were given to him? It would seem that restricting the wage
garnishment before the wages enter into the hands of the debtor
and then allowing complete wage garnishment after the debtor
gained control of his wages would defeat the whole purpose of
Congress' intent to protect debtors. Completely stripping a debtor
of his wages after he receives them creates the same burdens on the
52. See id at 360; see also Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Law
of Debtors and Creditors 86 (4th ed. 2001) ("If a garnishing judgment creditor
could seize the entire obligation owed by an employer to a judgment debtor,
then the judgment debtor's ability to survive might be seriously jeopardized.
The debtor's incentive to work would be sharply reduced, resulting in hardship
to the debtor's family or increased social costs.").
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (2004) (No employer may discharge any
employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to
garnishment for any one indebtedness.).
54. See sources cited supra note 48.
55. Rodgers, supra note 6, at 447 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 90-1040 (1967)).
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debtor as if his wages were completely garnished before he
received them. This long-standin congressional desire to protect
debtors is still emphasized today.
5
Since courts have brushed aside the broader legislative history
and intent and focused more on the statutory construction, it is
necessary to consider the validity of their analysis. Simply
because Congress did not allude to financial institutions when
drafting the wage garnishment statutes does not mean it intended to
exclude such institutions. One commentator has noted that "[a]
good exemption law ... is one that is reasonably flexible and...
adapts itself to changing circumstances." 57 A flexible exemption
policy reflects a societal interest to protect the livelihood of the
debtor and the debtor's family, outweighing the interests of the
creditor. 58  The statutory language is, in fact, flexible: "the
maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an
individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment
may not exceed twenty-five per centum of his disposable earnings
for that week ... . It was impossible for Congress to predict the
different possibilities of payment for wages. For example, it is
unlikely that Congress could foresee the growing practice of direct
deposit payment when the CCPA was drafted.6 °
The desire for a flexible statute is reflected in Congress'
deferral to the states for additional protection. The CCPA
specifically leaves states the authority of "prohibiting garnishments
or providing for more limited garnishments ...."6 1 Delegating to
56. Rodgers, supra note 6, at 447 n.96 ("It also must be noted that even with
the large number of bankruptcies today, Congress has emphasized tightening up
on creditor abuse, rather than the abuse of debtors who are washing away
debts.").
57. Taylor, supra note 48, at 468.
58. Id. at 467-68.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2004).
60. For suggestions on how Congress should handle the garnishment of
funds deposited directly in an individuals account see Law of Elec. Funds Trans.
Systems Chapter 18.02 ("[T]he Congressional intent to protect an individual's
earnings or income should be carried out regardless of the mode of payment
chosen by that individual .... Congress [should] establish an exemption from
attachment or garnishment whenever earnings are deposited directly into an
individual's account in [a] depository institution on the basis of a
preauthorization agreement .... If a deposit account were attached, only funds
in excess of the exemption level, if any, could be paid to the creditor. Funds up
to the amount of the exemption would remain in the account for the use of the
account holder."). See also Household Finance Corp. v. Kinder, 444 N.E.2d 99,
101 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1982) ("To allow the plaintiff to attach the wages in the
direct deposit account without first garnishing the employer will leave the
defendant in destitute.").
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (2004).
20051
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the states the power to further protect the debtor provides the basis
for Congress' thinking that additional protection may be necessary.
Since wage garnishments occur at the state level, states would be
better equipped to handle more quickly the changing circumstances
of wage garnishment and debtor protection.
In both the Dunlop and Melby cases, the courts were quick to
dismiss the opinion reports from the Department of Labor.62 In
these opinions, the Department of Labor suggested that the wage
garnishment statutes should apply to funds deposited'in financial
institutions.63 Courts do not have to follow these opinions, but
perhaps the courts dismissed them without enough consideration.
Exemption statutes are to be written flexibly64 and in a way to
evolve with the changing times and circumstances. If the intent of
Congress was to limit the number of bankruptcies and to write a
pro-debtor statute, who better to grasp the evolution of wage
garnishment and bankruptcy laws than the Department of Labor?
Congress even gave the Department of Labor the power to enforce
the federal garnishment laws.6 5 Again, by simply dismissing the
Department of Labor's recommendations, the courts display a
narrow view and acceptance of the societal importance of debtor
protection.
On a similar strand, disposable earnings are the earnings
remaining after the amounts required by law to be held are
deducted from the gross earnings. In other words, disposable
earnings are the earnings employees take home. The Melby court
concluded that wages deposited in a bank account do not constitute
disposable earnings as defined in the wage garnishment statute.66
To justify its reasoning, the Melby court cited the U.S. Supreme
62. See Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 399 F. Supp. 855, 857 (D.
Ariz. 1975); Melby v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Wis. 1979). Both
courts dismissed the opinions on the premise that in certain circumstances, great
weight should be given to administrative opinions, but the ultimate
interpretation of the statute rests with the court. The courts ruled that in this
case, upholding the Department of Labor's interpretation of the statute would be
reading intent in the statute that was not originally present.
63. See Dunlop, 399 F. Supp at 857; Melby, 276 N.W. 2d at 278 (citing U.S.
Department of Labor Opinion Letters of October 26, 1970 (CCH Lab.L.Rep.
P20,772) and August 3, 1972 (CCH Lab.L.Rep. P30,805)).
64. Taylor, supra note 48, at 468.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (2004) ("The Secretary of Labor may by
regulation exempt from the provisions of section 1673(a) and (b)(2) of this title
gamishments issued under the laws of any State if he determines that the laws of
that State provide restrictions on garnishment which are substantially similar to
those provided in section 1673(a) and (b)(2) of this title."); 15 U.S.C. § 1676
(2004) ("The Secretary of Labor, acting through the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of Labor, shall enforce the provisions of this subchapter.").
66. Melby, 276 N.W.2d at 275.
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Court's reasoning in Kokoszaka v. Be/ford,67 where the Court did
not include a tax refund as falling under the definition of
disposable earnings in the wage garnishment statute. The Melby
court concluded:
While it is clear that an income-tax refund is not derived
from earnings, it is equally clear it is not earnings in the
sense of payroll earnings, which would be available to
wage earners on pay day in the absence of a garnishment
proceeding.
It is also clear that bank accounts, although resulting from a
deposit of the employee's payroll check are not "disposable
earnings" sought to be protected by the Act ....
The Melby court's reasoning appears suspect. In the
garnishment cases, the issues are not about tax refunds. They are
about wage earnings in the disposable form. Protecting wages
deposited in a bank account is distinguishable from protecting a tax
refund. For example, wage earners do not normally rely on tax
refunds when attempting to provide for themselves and their
families. However, it appears more common that wage earners
would rely and depend on wages deposited in a bank account to
support their livelihood. To overlook this distinction fails to take
into account the ordinary practice and way of life for most hard-
working individuals.
In addition, these earnings in a bank account would be no
different from an individual's earnings that were not deposited in a
bank. For example, let us return to the introductory hypothetical
with Adam and John. However, assume Adam gets paid $1000 in
cash of which twenty-five percent is garnished, so Adam takes
home $750 in cash. If Adam takes home $750 in cash, one would
say the $750 represents his disposable earnings after the tax and
garnishment reduction.
Now assume also that John still receives $1000 by check, none
of which is garnished. John's $1000 check would constitute his
disposable earnings. If John takes the $1000 check, deposits the
check in his bank, and then immediately withdraws $750 in cash,
would the $750 not constitute cash disposable earnings equivalent
to that of Adam's? According to the rule in Melby, once John
67. 417 U.S. 642, 651, 94 S. Ct. 2431, 2436 (1974).
68. See Melby, 276 N.W.2d at 278 ("'disposable earnings' as used in secs.
1672 and 1673 did not include a tax refund but were 'limited to' periodic
payments of compensation and [do] not pertain to every asset that is traceable in
some way to compensation.") (citing Kokoszaka, 417 U.S. at 651, 94 S. Ct. at
2436)).
69. Melby, 276 N.W.2d. at 278.
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deposits his $1000, his earnings are no longer considered
disposable.
What if Adam took his $750 in cash, went home, and put it in
the bottom of his drawer for safekeeping? Would Adam's earnings
no longer be considered disposable? Would Adam's earnings be
different from John's earnings deposited in a bank? Adam simply
deposited his earnings in a drawer. It seems unjustified to consider
John's earnings as non-disposable simply because he deposited
them in a bank account. As a result of the courts' rulings,
absurdity exists. According to the courts, Congress intended for
debtors to not deposit any wages into a bank account, but keep
them in drawers instead. If they do deposit wages in a bank, their
wages lose their definition as disposable income and become
subject to garnishment.
Perhaps in their interpretations, the courts were worried about
the following situation. Assume Adam takes his disposable
earnings and purchases a motor bike for $750. He later sells the
bike for $750 and puts the money in a bank account. Would the
$750 now be considered disposable under Articles 1672 and 1673?
In this case, there exists a stronger argument that the proceeds from
the bike sale would not be accepted as disposable earnings under
the wage garnishment statutes. In this example, Adam's income
loses its liquidity when it is used to purchase a bike.7 ° The statute
is designed to protect the liquid assets that are necessary for the
debtor to protect himself and his family's livelihood. When a
debtor gives up or converts his liquid assets, as in the above
example where Adam buys a bike, one can assume that the money
was not intended to be used for everyday necessities, and thus
Adam would no longer be entitled to protection under the
garnishment statute. If the liquidity of a debtor's wages is
maintained, as in the form of cash or in a bank account for
example, the wage garnishment exemption should apply.
Compared to the hypothetical above, John's earnings, which are
deposited in a bank account, remain in their liquid state and thus
should be considered disposable and protected under the wage
garnishment statutes.
In addition, proponents of Dunlop and Melby might argue that
by allowing debtors to claim protection under the wage
garnishment statute to protect disposable assets, some debtors
might be tempted to abuse this statute and claim that large sums of
70. It is not within the scope of this paper to fully examine the moment
when income no longer becomes disposable. This hypothetical was an attempt
to distinguish wages directly deposited in a bank account from deposited money
resulting from other means.
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savings are saved wages, and are thus entitled to creditor
protection. For example, a wealthier person who has built up
disposable income might be able to save all his current wages in a
bank account and not tap into these saved resources for living
expenses. So, if his bank account is $100,000, he could claim that
$75,000 is protected, assuming he can prove that the deposits are
all from wages.
A counter argument exists, however, that by eliminating the
garnisa1ment exemptions to wages in bank accounts, courts have
created a greater benefit to the creditors. For instance, if a crafty
creditor knows that wages in a bank account are not protected from
complete garnishment, the creditor has a perverse incentive not to
seek garnishment of wages from the employer but instead to wait
until the debtor deposits his wages in a bank account. It is unlikely
that Congress intended for creditors to bypass garnishing wages at
the employer-employee level and instead attack bank accounts
directly.
To solve this issue, there must be a balance between the
interest of the creditor and the interest of the debtor.71 It is
plausible that a few wealthy individuals could take advantage of
the statute as proposed, but since it appears the majority of debtors
are not part of the wealthy class, it seems prudent to err in favor
of the poor. Society has a greater interest in protecting the poor
and preventing them from becoming an economic burden by
allowing them to become economically viable. As a result,
garnishment of wages should also be exempt when deposited in a
bank account. Moreover, if an individual has $100,000 in a bank
account, it is likely he has other assets worth taking, whereas it is
unlikely a poorer individual would have such additional luxuries.
Finally, it is necessary to give deference to one persuading
argument consistently presented by the courts. Proponents of
protecting wages after they have been deposited in bank accounts
have argued that courts should follow two other statutes regarding
veteran's benefits and social security payments as precedent. In
Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., the Supreme Court decided that a
veteran's benefits remain exempt from legal process after being
deposited in a bank account. 73 Similarly, in Lawrence v. Shaw
71. See Wage Garnishment, supra note 51, at 361.
72. See Sheila Driscoll, Consumer Bankruptcy and Gender, 83 Geo. L.J.
525, 530 (1994) ("[M]ost debtors fall within the lower middle-income class.
The debtors were not the poorest of the poor, rather, they were part of the near-
poor."); see also Teresa A. Sullivan, As We Forgive Our Debtors 65 (1989);
Philip Schuchman, New Jersey Debtors 1922-1932: An Empirical Study, 15
Seton Hall L. Rev. 541, 544 (1985).
73. 370U.S. 159, 82 S. Ct. 1231 (1962).
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and Philpott v. Essex,75 the Supreme Court concluded that the
Social Security Act protected social security payments from legal
process after they were deposited in bank accounts. The Dunlop
and Melby courts quickly distinguished the interpretations of these
statutes as non-applicable.76  77
In Usery v. First National Bank of Arizona, a case which
follows the Dunlop and Melby interpretation, the Ninth Circuit
compared the language of the Social Security Act and veteran's
benefits statute to the wage garnishment statute.78 The court found
that when compared to the wage garnishment statute, the language
of the social security and veteran's benefit statutes was broader in
nature and specifically protected those benefits when deposited in
a bank account. 79 The court reasoned: "If Congress had meant to
restrict creditors' access to wages even after they left the control of
the employer, it seems anomalous that it did not provide for
protection from attachment of such monies while in the hands of
the employee, as they did in the case of social security benefits."
80
It is unknown why Congress did not include similar language
in the garnishment statute. There is nothing in the legislative
history that sheds light on this particular matter. Instead of
spending time hypothesizing the many possible reasons why
Congress wrote the statute the way it did, it would be better to ask
whether the courts' rulings are consistent with Congress' overall
intent of the statute.
If one steps back and examines how the courts' decisions affect
the garnishment statute, one might easily find that the courts'
interpretation of the statute contravenes the intent of the framers of
the statute. The courts focus on the legislative intent to protect
wages and the garnishment process, but they ignore the
74. 300 U.S. 245, 57 S. Ct. 443 (1937).
75. 409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590 (1973).
76. See Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 399 F. Supp. 855, 857 (D.
Ariz. 1975) (court distinguishes garnishment statute from the social security
statute in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590
(1973), deciding that the welfare statute, 42 U.S.C. § 407, protects a given fund
where the garnishment statute regulates a garnishment process and not a given
fund); Melby v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Wis. 1979) (concluding that
the benefits set out in the social security and veteran's benefits statutes were to
be given broader protection than earnings protected under the garnishment
statute).
77. 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978).
78. Id.atl1O-11.
79. SeeId. at 111.
80. Id.
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overarching intent to protect the debtors. 8' Significant public
policy reasons exist that should compel Congress to protect the
debtors' wages after it leaves the hands of the employer. Based on
the courts' interpretations of the statute, Congress intended courts
to exempt wages while in the hands of the employer, but
subsequently allow complete garnishment of wages when the
debtor takes them into his possession. This scenario leads to
absurd results. It seems anomalous that Congress would intend to
provide debtor protection at one stage but then allow creditors to
circumvent this protection at another.
Moreover, as previously discussed, and as accepted by every
court, one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the
garnishment statute was to stop the consistent increase in
bankruptcies. If wages are completely garnished after a debtor
deposits them in a bank account, one main recourse for the debtor
to protect his interest and livelihood is to file for bankruptcy. The
courts' rulings lead to the exact result Congress set out to prevent
in the construction of the CCPA. In their rulings, courts have
ignored this logical result and have defied Congress' intent to
lower the number of bankruptcies. It appears that the courts were
quick to limit the scope of the statute without fully considering the
results of their interpretations.
D. Suggestions to Congress
The courts' interpretations of the federal wage garnishment
statute are too narrow and ignore the larger issues of protecting the
debtor and his livelihood. Congress must clarify this issue by
amending the statute. It can accomplish this task by adding
language to 15 U.S.C. § 1673 similar to that in the social security
or veteran's benefits statutes. Alternatively, Congress can simply
add a provision which allows continuation of the exemption after
wages leave the employer's hands.
For example, an amended 15 U.S.C. § 1673 could read as
follows: 82
(a) Maximum allowable garnishment
Except as provided in subsection (b) (d) of this section and
in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of the
aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any
workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not
81. See discussion on Congressional intent supra Part I.C.
82. The underlined portion represents added language and the strikeout
portion represents language that was removed from the existing statute.
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exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week,
or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that
week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly
wage prescribed by section 206(a)(1) of Title 29 in effect at
the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less. In the
case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the
Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple
of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to
that set forth in paragraph (2).
(b) Disposable earnings not subject to garnishment as
provided in subsection (a) shall not lose their exempt status
when paid from the employer to the employee by cash,
check, direct deposit, or other payment means.
(c) The exemption outlined in subsection (b) shall be lost
when disposable earnings resulting from wages are
converted into illiquid assets not otherwise exempt.
(b) (d) Exceptions...
It is unfortunate that clarification has not come sooner, but with
the advent and growing use of electronic direct deposits of wages
in bank accounts, 83 perhaps now is the perfect time to clarify the
statute before the courts erode Congress' original intent.
II. THE LOUISIANA STATUTE: EXEMPTIONS FROM THE
GARNISHMENT OF WAGES
Louisiana state courts have yet to confront the issue dealt with
in the Dunlop and Melby decisions.84 If and when the issue does
83. Though this is outside the scope of this article, for suggestions on how
Congress should handle the garnishment of funds deposited directly in an
individual's account see discussion supra note 60. See also In re Sinclair, 2005
WL 1669012 (5th Cir. 2005) (addressing the issue of garnishment of a salary
directly-deposited into a worker's banking account).
84. See In re Sinclair, 2005 WL 1669012. While this article was in the
production process, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
Louisiana's garnishment exemption statute, La. R.S. 13:3881, does not protect
funds deposited in bank accounts. In this case, Sinclair argued that his wages
placed in his bank account by direct-deposit should be protected under the
Louisiana statute. The bankruptcy court originally found that the wages should
be exempt, but the district court, and ultimately the appellate court, disagreed.
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit found that the broad opening language of the
statute was modified and narrowly construed by the statute's definition of
disposable earnings. Id. at 3.
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arise, Louisiana courts will have to examine two principles. First,
the courts must determine whether the Louisiana statute on wage
garnishment exemption differs from the federal statute. Second, if
the state statute does differ, the courts must analyze whether the
statutory history of the Louisiana statute offers greater protection
to Louisiana debtors.
A. Case Analysis from Other States
Despite the holdings by some courts ruling that Congress did
not intend to protect wages after they were deposited in a financial
institution, 85 other courts have decided that allowing creditors to
pursue earnings in the hands of the debtor affords the debtor less
protection than he would have under a wage exemption statute that
extended protection to a defined fund of wages. 86  Since the
garnishment statutes under the CCPA were derived from state
statutes, it is prudent to address how some states would examine
this question. In particular, two cases examine the issue of wage
garnishment from bank accounts in a different light: Miller v.
Monrean and Midamerica Savings Bank v. Miehe.
1. Miller v. Monrean
As will be discussed in this Section, a broader interpretation should be made
in interpreting this statute. The appellate court appears to assume that the scope
and intent of the statue is clear. However, as this article points out, the statute is
not clear, and as a result, under the rules of statutory interpretation, the court
should have examined the statutory history and legislative intent. The appellate
court's ruling follows a line of federal court rulings which narrowly interprets
garnishment exemption statutes without fully examining the legislative intent
behind the statutes. In re Sinclair should nonetheless highlight the
contemporary importance of this article and the current need to address the wage
garnishment exemptions in Louisiana.
85. See, e.g., Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 399 F. Supp. 855 (D.
Ariz. 1975); Melby v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274 (Wis. 1979); Usery v. First
Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Lawrence, 205 B.R.
115 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Edwards v. Henry, 293 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980); Frazer, Ryan, Goldberg, Keyt & Lawless v. Smith, 907 P.2d 1384 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995).
86. See, e.g., In re Kobernusz, 160 B.R. 844, 848 (D. Colo. 1993) ("To
follow the logic of Plaintiff, money received from an employer, even if exempt
at time of payment, would lose such exemption when placed into a wallet. Such
a result would be absurd and improper."); Midamerica Savings Bank v. Miehe,
438 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1989).
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In Miller v. Monrean,87 The Alaska Supreme Court held that
funds exempt by state statute do not lose their exempt status when
deposited in a debtor's bank account. A paycheck of $423.21 was
deposited in Miller's checking account. Between the date of
deposit and the date of the levy of execution, the Millers used all
but $260.68 to pay for living expenses. 89 This remaining balance
was thus subject to levy by creditors. The Millers claimed that
under the Alaskan statute, $350 of the $423.21 was subject to
exemption and, thus, only $73.21 would be subject to levy.'u As a
result, Miller asked that $187.47 ($260.68 of the remaining balance
minus the $73.21 that was not exempt) be returned to him as an
exempt amount.
The district court and state appellate court denied Miller's
claim for exemption. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts' rulings. The appellees in this case argued that the
Alaskan statute was similar to the federal statute, 15 U.S.C. §§
1671-1677, in that it contains no language that would allow
exemption of income after a debtor received and deposited his
income in a checking account.9' The Alaska Supreme Court stated
that the purpose of the federal statute was not to protect the
earnings of the debtor, but instead to make garnishment a less
attractive means for a creditor to get repaid.92 In suport of this,
the court only cites the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1671. The court
87. 507 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1973).
88. Id. at 772.
89. Id.
90. Id. In its decision the court examined the former Alaskan statutes §
09.35.080(1) which read as follows:
The following property is exempt from execution, except as otherwise
specifically provided when selected and reserved by the judgment
debtor or his agent at the time of the levy, or as soon after levy and
before sale as the existence of the levy becomes known to him: (1) the
income of the judgment debtor, regardless of when it became payable,
for work performed during the preceding 30 days, or otherwise earned
or inured to his benefit within the 30-day period; the 30-day period
shall be reckoned back from the date of the levy, but the exemption
may not exceed $350 if he is the head of a family, and the amount of
$200 if he is not the head of a family; the amount of the exemption
shall be computed after deductions and payments, required by law or
court order, so as to assure the judgment debtor the receipt of the first
$350 per month if he is the head of a family or $200 if he is not the
head of a family, when it appears by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise
that the income is necessary for his use or for the use of his family
which is supported in whole or in part by his income ....
91. Id. at 773.
92. Id. at 774.
93. Id. at 774 n.5. Congress set forth its findings in 15 U.S.C. § 1671 in
part as follows:
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found it unnecessary to compare the two statutes because it found
that the Alaskan statute specifically stated the exemption for heads
of households, and thus, the purpose of the statute was to protect
the debtor's income after it was received to meet his family
needs. 94  The court wrote, "it would be anomalous to limit the
protection of AS 09.35.080(1) to income in the hands of the
employer.
95
2. Midamerica Savings Bank v. Miehe
In Midamerica Savings Bank v. Miehe,96 the Iowa Supreme
Court also addressed the issue of whether funds lose their exempt
status when deposited in a bank account. The bank account of
Miehe was garnished by Midamerica Bank as a result of mortgage
indebtedness. Miehe claimed that the funds in the bank account
consisted of personal earnings exempted under the Iowa Code
section 642.2 1. Reversing the judgment for the creditor, the
Iowa Supreme Court ruled: "If wages intended by law to be
exempt from creditors' claims are only accorded that status in the
hands of the debtor's employer, the protection can be rendered
meaningless by creditors levying on the funds in the hands of the
(a) The Congress finds:
(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal
services encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit. Such
extensions of credit divert money into excessive credit payments and
thereby hinder the production and flow of goods in interstate
commerce.
(2) The application of garnishment as a creditor's remedy frequently
results in loss of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption
of employment, production, and consumption constitutes a substantial
burden on interstate commerce.
94. Id. at 774.
95. Id. at 775.
96. 438 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1989).
97. Iowa Code § 642.21 (1987). Exemption from net earnings:
1. The disposable earnings of an individual are exempt from
garnishment to the extent provided by the federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act, Title III, 15 U.S.C. secs. 1671-1677 (1982). The
maximum amount of an employee's earnings which may be garnished
during any one calendar year is two hundred fifty dollars for each
judgment creditor, except as provided in chapter 252D and sections
598.22, 598.23, and 627.12, or when those earnings are reasonably
expected to be in excess of twelve thousand dollars for that calendar
year as determined from the answers taken by the sheriff or by the court
pursuant to section 642.5, subsection 4.
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debtor or on the debtor's bank account. ' 98  The Iowa court
circumvented the federal statute concluding that the Iowa
Legislature adopted parts of the federal law "for some, but
certainly not all, purposes to protect wage earners from creditors
levying on their wages. '99 Upon examining the statutory history, it
found that the rationale to protect the debtor's funds deposited in a
bank account that existed in Iowa in the 1930's still existed at the
time of the current case. 00 Thus, the court read the Iowa statute as
granting additional protections to wage earners not granted by the
federal law. The court did add an additional caveat to the debtor's
attempt to declare garnishment protection. The court reasoned that
"[b]ecause the purpose of allowing wages to retain their exempt
character is to facilitate payment of ordinary living expenses, the
continuation of exempt status is conditioned upon tracing the
deposits from wages received within a ninety-day period preceding
the levy."''1 1 Despite the fact that the Iowa statute incorporated
language from the federal wage garnishment statute, the court
concluded that wages deposited in bank accounts should be
exempted from seizure by creditors.
B. The Louisiana Statute
To understand this issue in Louisiana, it is first necessary to
examine the Louisiana statute and compare it to the federal statute.
If the two statutes were similar, it would be more difficult for a
debtor to claim an exemption based on the federal courts'
interpretation of the statute. However, if the statutes were
different, a debtor might argue that, like in the states of Alaska and
Iowa, Louisiana has extended a greater protection to debtors than
the federal statutes have, as currently interpreted by the courts.
1. Comparing the Language of the Louisiana Exemption
Statute to the Language of the Federal Statute
At first glance, the Louisiana statute appears similar to the
federal statute. 1 02 Like the federal statute, the Louisiana statute
98. Midamerica, 438 N.W.2d at 839; see also General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Falcone, 327 A.2d 699, 701 (N.J. 1974); Daugherty v. Central Trust
Co., 504 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (Ohio 1986); Benson v. Richardson, 537 N.W.2d
748 (Iowa 1995); In re Kobemusz, 160 B.R. 844, 848 (D. Colo. 1993).
99. Midamerica, 438 N.W.2d at 838.
100. SeeId.at839.
101. Id. at 839-40.
102. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3881 (2004) and the pertinent language
provides:
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exempts the same percentage of wages from garnishment, seventy-
five percent. However, the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:3881 is in fact different from that of the federal statute, 15
U.S.C. § 1673. From a textual standpoint, it appears that Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:3881 goes further in its protection of the
debtor. The language, "exempt from seizure under any writ,
mandate, or process whatsoever" appears to extend protection
beyond the employer-employee. In fact, this wording is similar to
the wording used in the federal Social Security and veteran's
benefit acts. The Social Security Act contains the language,
"[N]one of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this
subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal process .... 1 Similarly, veteran's
benefits are those benefits that "shall not be liable to attachment,
levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process
whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." In
both cases, courts have used this lanuage to extend protection to
amounts deposited in bank accounts, ° 5 and in cases where courts
have rejected the notion exempting wages when deposited in bank
accounts, the courts have still upheld the social security and
veteran's benefit exemptions.1°6 As a result of this phraseology,
A. The following income or property of a debtor is exempt from seizure
under any writ, mandate, or process whatsoever except as otherwise
herein provided:
(1)(a) Seventy-five percent of his disposable earnings for any week, but
in no case shall this exemption be less than an amount in disposable
earnings which is equal to thirty times the federal minimum hourly
wage in effect at the time the earnings are payable or a multiple or
fraction thereof, according to whether the employee's pay period is
greater or less than one week ....
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of
any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any
amounts required by law to be withheld and which amounts are
reasonable and are being deducted in the usual course of business at the
time the garnishment is served upon the employer ....
103. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (2004) (emphasis added).
104. 38 U.S.C. § 1970(g) (2004) (emphasis added).
105. See Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590
(1973) (holding social security payments exempt when deposited in a bank
account); Porter v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 82 S. Ct. 1231
(1962) (holding veteran's benefits remain exempt even when deposited in a
federal savings and loan account).
106. See Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 399 F. Supp. 855, 857 (D.
Ariz. 1975); Usery v. First National Bank of Arizona, 586 F.2d 107, 110-111
(9th Cir. 1978); Edwards v. Henry, 293 N.W.2d 756, 758-759 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980).
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the Louisiana statute provides greater protection for debtors than
the federal statute.
2. A Brief History of the Louisiana Exemption Statute
The legislative language of wage garnishment has been
longstanding and relatively unchanged in Louisiana. The
legislature decided well before the passage of the Federal CCPA
that income of a debtor would be exempt from garnishment "under
any writ, mandate, or process whatsoever .... ,,107 After the
passage of the federal statute, Louisiana aligned itself only with the
percentages of the federal statute, chanfing the exemption from
eighty percent to seventy-five percent.' 0 The pertinent language
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3881 and percentage of wage
exemption exist unchanged today. 109
3. The Legislative Intent and Interpretation of the Louisiana
Exemption Statute
Louisiana case law has clearly laid out the longstanding
purpose of the exemption statute. The purpose of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:3881 is "to provide for the subsistence,
welfare, and 'fresh start' for debtor, to [the] end that his or her
family will not be destitute and to [thel end that [the] debtor will
not become [a] charge of the state.' r The idea of exemption
statutes stems from the desire to protect the debtor and also from
the policy of protecting the necessities of life."' For example,
"The notion of exempt property is founded on an idea of
humaneness; the law declares to be exempt those items which are
necessary to the life of the debtor; to take them from him would be
to expose him to death by starvation."' 12 In deciding whether the
purpose of the statute should be construed to protect debtors'
wages after they have been deposited in a bank account, one must
107. See 1960 La. Acts No. 32, § 6 (Article 644 was repealed and its subject
matter was incorporated into the new La. R.S. 13:3881. The language "under
any writ, mandate, or process" was carried over into the new Act.)
108. See 1970 La. Acts No. 242, § 1.
109. See La. R.S. 13:3881 (2004).
110. In re Black, 225 B.R. 610, 614 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998); see also In re
Brown, 189 B.R. 653, 660 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1995); Ward v. Turner, 150 B.R.
378, 380 (E.D. La. 1993); In re Hendricks, 45 B.R. 965, 972 (Bankr. M.D. La.
1985).
111. Joanne C. Ferriot, Garnishment and the Poor in Louisiana, 33 Loy. L.
Rev. 79, 86 (1987).
112. M. Plainol, Traite Elementaire De Droit Civil No. 184 (1912) (as
translated and cited in Ferriot, supra note 111, at 86).
256 [Vol. 66
COMMENTS
also consider that exemption statutes in Louisiana are to be
interpreted broadly and liberally so that the obvious purpose of the
statutes is not frustrated.' 
13
In extending the exemption coverage to wages in bank
accounts, Louisiana courts would not appear to frustrate the
intention of the statute. This extension not only continues to
protect debtors, but it also provides the debtors with disposable
income to support their families. Moreover, if the purpose of the
exemption statute in Louisiana is to protect debtors, then
garnishing all wages after they are deposited in a bank account
would appear to completely frustrate the legislative intent. The
intended exemption would be dramatically decreased, if not
eliminated.
There is at least one possible argument a creditor might raise
against extending the wage exemption to bank accounts. It has
been held that because Louisiana exemption statutes are in
"derogation of the general rule of non-exemption, they should be
construed as written, with no exemptions being added to embrace a
generalized notion of public policy or deleted in favor of the
general rule of non-exemption." 14 So, it must be asked, does
extending this rule to cover bank accounts add to the exemption
statute and counter the written rule? The language of the statute is
clear-seventy-five percent of a debtor's income is exempt from
seizure under any writ, mandate, or process whatsoever."
l 5
Garnishing all wages out of a bank account would appear to be
another mandate or process that the statute specifically prevents.
This broad prevention is important in that it appears that the
legislature specifically wanted to protect such wages. This not
only follows the theme of protecting the debtor, but it also
incorporates the principle that exemption statutes must be written
flexibly enough to evolve over time. By extending the wage
exemption to a bank account, courts would not be defying the
written rule, but they would be continuing to enforce Louisiana's
overarching debtor protection policy.
C. Suggestions to the Louisiana Legislature
The Louisiana statute is different and broader than the federal
statute. As a result, Louisiana courts should follow the similar
conclusions reached by the supreme courts in Alaska and Iowa and
extend the wage exemption protection to wages deposited in bank
113. In re Ballard, 238 B.R. 610, 635 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999).
114. Id. at635.
115. La. R.S. 13:3881 (2004).
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accounts. This ruling would not go beyond the intent of the
legislature and the statute, but, instead, would reaffirm Louisiana's
commitment to aiding the debtor.
However, it might be more prudent for the Louisiana
Legislature to amend the statute now. First, since courts are
unpredictable and may decide to follow the federal interpretation,
this preemptive amendment would prevent having to amend the
statute in the future. Second, and perhaps more importantly, in
amending the statute, the legislature would send a clear message of
legislative intent to creditors. It would not be a stretch to assume
that some creditors might be taking advantage of this unsettled
issue in Louisiana. A crafty creditor would attempt to levy
anything and everything, making bank accounts fair game. In
addition, since the majority of debtors live below the middle class,
it seems likely that they cannot afford the expense of challenging
creditors and this issue in higher courts. Perhaps this is why the
issue has not yet been discussed in Louisiana courts. Nevertheless,
by amending the statute now, the legislature would provide debtor
lawyers with better clarity and ammunition to protect the debtor's
interest and livelihood. The statute could be amended with similar
language that was suggested for the federal statute in Section I-D
of this article. For example the Louisiana Legislature could add
the following subsection:
1 (c) The exemption of disposable earnings proscribed in
subsection (a) shall not be lost when disposable earnings are
paid from the employer to the employee by cash, check, direct
deposit, or other payment means except when the disposable
earnings are converted in the purchase of illiquid assets not
otherwise exempt.
CONCLUSION
Federal and state courts differ on whether wages should be
exempt from complete garnishment when deposited in financial
institutions. Though some might undervalue the importance of this
issue, the livelihoods of all debtors and their respective families
could hang in the balance.
The advent of federal wage garnishment restrictions resulted
from increasing bankruptcies among American debtors. In an
effort to curb this outbreak, Congress believed that restricting the
then unrestricted state garnishment laws to at least a seventy-five
percent exemption of wages from garnishment would help alleviate
the growing number of bankruptcies. However, the federal statutes
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are unclear as to whether the seventy-five percent exemption
should extend to wages deposited in bank accounts.
The courts in Dunlop v. First National Bank of Arizona and
Melby v. Anderson concluded that wages lose their exemption
when deposited in bank accounts. The courts reasoned that the
intent of the statute was to protect the employer-employee
relationship and thus the garnishment exemption ceased after the
wages went into the possession of the employee. The courts
examined only half of the picture. While it is true that one goal of
the garnishment statutes was to protect employees from losing
their jobs, there exists a second and equally important concept that
the garnishment statutes were developed to protect the livelihood
of the debtor and his family. This congressional intent can be
found in the legislative history and construed from the large
exemption granted in the statute's language. These courts have
ignored this aspect and taken a narrow view when interpreting the
federal garnishment statute. The courts have abrogated the
congressional intent and the pertinent public policy considerations
behind protecting wages from complete garnishment. As a result,
Congress should quickly amend the federal statute to protect
debtors before courts provide creditors with even greater access to
debtors' livelihoods.
Regardless of whether Congress tackles this important task, the
Louisiana Legislature should act on its own volition and protect its
debtors. Congress has provided all states with the opportunity to
protect debtors beyond the parameters laid out in the federal
statute. Some state supreme courts have examined state statutes
and found that the legislative intent behind the respective statutes
provides for greater protection to the debtor and his family than
that offered by the federal statute. In Louisiana, the legislative
history and intent behind the Louisiana wage garnishment statute
clearly provide for greater protection. The Louisiana statute is
written in broader language than the federal statute. It contains the
same protective intent as the states whose courts have extended
wage exemption to bank accounts. The purpose behind the statute
has been held by courts to protect the debtor and the debtor's
family. Based on this long-standing history and purpose, it would
be futile for Louisiana to provide debtors with a wage garnishment
exemption and then quickly remove this exemption should its
debtors deposit wages in a bank account. The legislature could
leave the statute untouched and allow unpredictable state courts to
muddy the issue. The better solution is to amend the statute now.
Louisiana's livelihood depends on the livelihood of its citizens.
A debtor and his family's livelihood are no less important. By
protecting wages deposited in bank accounts, the Louisiana
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Legislature would continue the state's longstanding policy of
protecting the debtor. Louisiana would not leave its citizens, like
Adam and John, asking the question, "where is the exemption?"
Unlike the federal courts, Louisiana would provide a clear
answer-in the debtor's favor.
G. Wogan Bernard"
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